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Summary: Brewin and Andrews (2016) propose that just 15% of people, or even fewer, are susceptible to false childhood memories.
If this ﬁgure were true, then false memories would still be a serious problem. But the ﬁgure is higher than 15%. False memories
occur even after a few short and low-pressure interviews, and with each successive interview, they become richer, more compelling,
and more likely to occur. It is therefore dangerously misleading to claim that the scientiﬁc data provide an “upper bound” on
susceptibility to memory errors. We also raise concerns about the peer review process. © 2016 The Authors Applied Cognitive
Psychology Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Decades of research shows that people can come to remember
events that never happened. In fact, as scientists who conduct
this kind of research, we know it is not all that difﬁcult to ‘im-
plant’ false memories. Many participants in our experiments
remember a wide range of experiences that just were not so.
It is puzzling, therefore, that Brewin and Andrews (2016)
say it is hard to implant false memories, that false memories
are rare, and that false memory rates are overstated.
If Brewin and Andrews (2016) want to make broad,
sweeping conclusions about this literature, then they should
have obtained the original data from as many researchers as
possible, combined those data, and recoded them. They could
have done exactly that—after all, they contacted several re-
searchers for information in the course of writing their paper.
But thankfully, others have already undertaken this task.
Scoboria et al. (submitted) recently conducted a mega-analy-
sis in which they combined and recoded the data from eight
published memory implantation studies. They found that,
overall, 22% of subjects reported either ‘complete’ or ‘sub-
stantial’ false memories, and a further 9% reported ‘partial’
false memories. Put another way, nearly a third of people
came to remember something about an event that never hap-
pened. The fact that more than a ﬁfth of people in Scoboria
et al.’s analysis, or 15% in Brewin and Andrews’ analysis,
developed rich false memories packed with perceptual detail
is somewhat astounding given that some of these memories
were elicited under experimental conditions designed to pro-
duce low false-memory rates (e.g., Ost, Foster, Costall, &
Bull, 2005, and the control conditions in studies such as
Desjardins & Scoboria, 2007, and Hyman & Pentland,
1996).
Brewin and Andrews (2016) also complain that almost no
one in an imagination inﬂation study experiences false mem-
ories. But the aim of imagination inﬂation research is not
usually to create false memories. Instead, it is to investigate
the ways in which imagining counterfactual childhood
events can inﬂate people’s conﬁdence that those events were
real. In fact, Brewin and Andrews themselves admit that this
work is “by and large only intended to assess autobiograph-
ical belief” (p.17).
Now, perhaps at this point, a critic might charge that the lit-
erature we have just presented conﬁrms that most people are
not susceptible to the inﬂuences that create false memories or
false beliefs. That is essentially what Brewin and Andrews
(2016) themselves have said. But such a claim fundamentally
misrepresents scientiﬁc understanding. After all, let us con-
sider the differences between laboratory paradigms and the
real-world situations they parallel. When we conduct these
memory implantation studies, we do not pair an authoritative
therapist with a vulnerable client. We are not spending weeks
and weeks suggesting to a vulnerable client—who is
searching for reasons for her current problems—that she has
buried childhood trauma in some dark corner of her memory.
Instead, we pair a 20-something-year-old graduate student
with a volunteer. They meet a few times over the course of
a week or two, while the graduate student encourages the
volunteer to try and remember something that did not happen.
The fact that such a weak analog of dubious recovered-
memory techniques produces false memories at any rate,
let alone in a sizable minority, is astonishing.
Moreover, study after study shows that what begins merely
as a subject’s willingness to entertain a suggestion often
develops over the course of the study into a richer and compel-
ling recollection. People’s ratings of the characteristics of their
own memories also increase in parallel with independent
judges’ ratings.We can ponder for amoment what would hap-
pen as the number of sessions increased to approximate the
number of times someone would see a therapist. The smart
money is on the prediction that the rate of false memories and
the strength of self-report ratings would increase.
It is clear that there are copious reasons to predict that the
rates of false memory reported in these studies do not repre-
sent an upper bound on people’s susceptibility to suggestion.
But let us stop to consider the counterfactual for a moment.
What if Brewin and Andrews were right? What would it
mean if only 15% of people, or even fewer, were susceptible
to wholly false memories? Brewin and Andrews (2016)
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repeatedly imply that because false memories (apparently)
occur in only a tiny fraction of people, scientists are making
a mountain out of a molehill. But let us look at this ﬁnding
another way. If there were a drug on the market that pro-
duced ‘adverse events’ at even the low, incorrect rate the au-
thors suggest, it would be taken off the market in a ﬂash.
But let us stay in the realm of psychology. Suppose a clin-
ical disorder occurred in 15% of the general population. We
would consider that disorder to be highly prevalent. Would
Brewin and Andrews? Given their longstanding interest in
trauma, let us consider a concrete example, such as Posttrau-
matic Stress Disorder (PTSD). The lifetime prevalence of
PTSD among adult Americans is estimated at 6.8%. That is
less than half of the incorrect rate of false memories that
Brewin and Andrews (2016) estimate—but they quite right-
fully do not relegate PTSD to molehill status. How about
other serious psychological disorders? Many serious psycho-
logical disorders have a prevalence of under 3%, and some
even less than 1%. But if 1 person in 100 has a disorder that
seriously affects the quality of their life and ability to func-
tion, that is a huge number in absolute terms at the level of
the population. So even if 15% were a correct ﬁgure, it is still
hard to understand how Brewin and Andrews could marshal
an argument that 15% is not worth worrying about.
Brewin and Andrews (2016) also take to task scholars who
—in their writings and expert testimony—talk about the fal-
libility of memory. But these scholars know a lot more about
memory fallibility than just the three paradigms that Brewin
and Andrews dissect. For instance, memory scholars know
about self-enhancing memory distortions, such as Bahrick,
Hall, and Berger’s (1996) famous work showing that people
remember their school grades as better than they actually
were. They know about studies of people who came to re-
member they were abused, but later realized their memories
were false (Lief & Fetkewicz, 1995; De Rivera, 2000). These
scholars know about research with subjects who remember
being abducted by aliens, for whom these memories feel en-
tirely real (McNally et al., 2004). These scholars also know
the many studies of misinformation showing that people’s
memories are easily and quickly distorted (see Schacter &
Loftus, 2013, for a review). In short, scholarly opinions about
the fragility of memory derive from many different types of
studies that go far beyond what Brewin and Andrews
reviewed.
Considered as a whole, Brewin and Andrews’ (2016) pa-
per ignores the facts so blithely that it seems more suited to
being called an Op-Ed piece than a peer reviewed ‘Research
Article’. Maybe that is because it probably was not peer
reviewed. We asked both the founding editor and the editor
who invited our commentary whether Brewin and Andrews’
paper had been sent out for peer review. They did not an-
swer. We also contacted 21 false-memory experts whom
Brewin and Andrews cited, and we asked these experts if
they would be willing to conﬁrm that—just like the ﬁve of
us—they did not review the original submission for ACP.
Each of them answered: none of them had reviewed it. These
data ﬁt with other data on the interval between when Brewin
and Andrews ﬁrst submitted this paper and when it was ac-
cepted. A close look at the publication history reveals a curi-
ously short interval: just 28 days, which apparently included
sufﬁcient time for revisions and resubmission. But perhaps
such a short turnaround time means that Applied Cognitive
Psychology has recently committed itself to extremely
speedy peer review. To address this possibility, we examined
all papers appearing in the ﬁrst three 2016 issues of ACP that
were designated as a ‘Research Article’ (like Brewin and
Andrews’ paper). Among these 39 papers, the mean turn-
around was 282 days, a ﬁgure more than 10 times the 28 days
Brewin and Andrews enjoyed. The median turnaround was
261 days, with a range of 101–699 days. In other words, even
the paper with the next quickest turnaround still took nearly
four times as long.
Of course, it goes without saying that peer review is cru-
cial. Because of that fact, scholarly publishers worldwide
have embraced the Code of Conduct put forth by the world-
wide Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). More than
900 journals and dozens of publishers are members, who
choose to comply with the COPE Code, and its Principles
of Transparency and Best Practice in Scholarly Publishing.
The very ﬁrst Principle says:
Peer review process: Journal content must be clearly
marked as whether peer reviewed or not. Peer review is
deﬁned as obtaining advice on individual manuscripts
from reviewers expert in the ﬁeld who are not part of
the journal’s editorial staff. This process, as well as any
policies related to the journal’s peer review procedures,
shall be clearly described on the journal’s Web site (Com-
mittee on Publication Ethics, 2014)
Some of our science’s best publishing houses and journals
refer to COPE. For example, Elsevier obliged all its journals
(including the Journal of Applied Research in Memory &
Cognition) to follow COPE principles. Wiley-Blackwell
has, for some reason, left this decision to each journal. As
a result of that decision, what are we commenting on now?
A ﬂawed opinion piece masquerading as a peer reviewed
article.
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